

The Fallacy of the “Currency War” under the Flexible Rates

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
Each Country can undo the Negative Spill-over

- Sachs (with Eichengreen), Cooper in 1984
- Historically as well as theoretically the Beggar-Thy-Neighbor Doctrine is false.
- Monetary approach to exchange rates combined with strategic (game theoretic) approach will prove in a classical setting that
- Laissez faire monetary policy by each country will achieve the Pareto-optimum configuration. (Hamada-Okada, 2007)

Naive Currency War

Target: Nominal Exchange Rate

Japan Monetary Policy




Results: World Inflation

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Targets: Price Levels (Unemployment rate)

(Reality)




Results: Harmony: Laissez-Faire leads to a Pareto Optimum. Each country can undo the negative effect of its neighbor.

Cf: Eichengreen-Sachs (1984), Hamada-Okada (2009)

The Meltdown of the World Currency System

Targets: The price level of the neighbor country



Japan aiming Brazil's price level
Brazil aiming Japan's price level